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I.  Introduction 
 
The economic crisis that began in 2008 led many states and localities to look for ways to reduce 
labor costs, which form a substantial portion of government budgets.  Some state legislatures 
focused on collective bargaining laws, with Wisconsin being the most high profile 
example.  Along with the restrictions on bargaining,
[1]
 a number of states moved to limit the 
collection of union dues.  The limitations were not across the board, but primarily directed at 
either political expenditures of unions or at particular unions, most commonly education 
unions.  Not surprisingly, the laws enacted were immediately subjected to legal challenge since 
unions, like every other organization, depend on finances to operate. This article will review the 
newly enacted legislation relating to union dues, the resulting legal challenges, and the law on 
which they are based.  It will also highlight countervailing trends in some states and discuss the 
Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Knox v. Service Employees International Union Local 
1000[2] which portends additional possible restrictions on unions’ ability to collect dues.  The 
article will end with an analysis of why the legislative focus on union dues, which have virtually 
no direct impact on government budgets, and a discussion of the implications of these 
developments for the future. This is an area of law that is in flux and bears watching, as it will 
impact the survival of unions and stable labor relations.[3] 
 
II. The Legal Background 
 
Litigation over union dues is ubiquitous, in part because of the role played by the Right to Work 
Legal Defense Foundation, which has an express purpose of litigating issues relating to union 
dues in order to prevent unions from requiring employees to pay them.
[4]
 A series of Supreme 
Court cases have set the parameters of the law.  The First Amendment free speech provisions and 
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause have formed the basis of most of the 
challenges. 
 
The First Amendment limits the ability of unions to collect dues from objecting 
employees.  Unions may require payments from employees who are not voluntary members of 
the union only in states that authorize unions to charge the costs of representation to all 
employees that they are required to represent.  These states either require payment by statute or 
expressly permit unions and employers to negotiate agreements mandating payment.  The 
purposes for which these fair share or agency fees can be used are limited by the First 
Amendment to activities related to collective bargaining; they may not be spent on “ideological 
activities unrelated to collective bargaining.”[5] Objectors can prevent the use of their fees for 
these nonchargeable expenditures and have the right to challenge the union’s determination as to 
which expenditures are chargeable.
[6]
 Further, states may constitutionally prevent unions from 
using agency fees of nonmembers for political purposes without their consent.
[7]
 
 
The Supreme Court has also addressed First Amendment and Equal Protection challenges to 
state law limits on payroll deduction of dues and agency fees.  Such dues checkoffs make it 
much easier for the union to collect dues and fees.  In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 
the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to Idaho’s law barring deduction of employees’ 
dues used for political purposes, stating that the law merely declined to assist in promoting 
speech and did not actively abridge the employees’ freedom of speech. [8] As a result, the state 
need only show a rational basis for its decision, and the desire to avoid entanglement in partisan 
politics satisfied that standard.[9] That the law might reduce funds available to the union was of 
no moment in the absence of a direct abridgement of speech.[10] 
 
In City of Charlotte v. Local 660, International Association of Firefighters, the Supreme Court 
upheld the city’s refusal to deduct union dues despite the fact that it granted deduction requests 
for other purposes. [11] The Court held that the city’s established standards for determining 
which dues deduction requests it would grant met the rational basis test.[12] 
 
The city has determined that it will provide withholding only for programs of general interest 
in which all city or departmental employees can, without more, participate. Employees can 
participate in the union checkoff only if they join an outside organization the union. Thus, 
Local 660 does not fit the category of groups for which the city will withhold. We cannot say 
that denying withholding to associational or special interest groups that claim only some 
departmental employees as members and that employees must first join before being eligible 
to participate in the checkoff marks an arbitrary line so devoid of reason as to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. Rather, this division seems a reasonable method for providing the 
benefit of withholding to employees in their status as employees, while limiting the number of 
instances of withholding and the financial and administrative burdens attendant thereon.[13] 
 
Ysursa and City of Charlotte indicate that complete bans on dues deduction, whether for political 
purposes or generally, are likely to survive legal challenge. Yet if the employer distinguishes 
among organizations in application of its dues policy, it must at least have a rational basis for 
such distinctions. Additionally, while the government may freely decline to assist or fund citizen 
speech, it may not do so for reasons based on viewpoint.[14] Dues deduction bans that apply to 
some groups of employees and organizations and not others are vulnerable to legal 
challenge.[15] 
 
Applying these principles, lower courts have upheld policies that limit payroll deduction to 
unions that are majority representatives as justified by goals of labor peace and stability.
[16]
 For 
similar reasons, courts have upheld numerosity requirements that limit payroll deduction to 
unions with larger memberships.
[17]
 In South Carolina Education Ass’n v. Campbell, the Fourth 
Circuit upheld a law which barred dues deductions for all membership organizations except one 
open to all state employees.[18] The court recognized several rational bases for the limit, 
including the administrative and financial burdens of deducting dues for every requesting 
organization and fostering healthy employment relations with the state’s employees through the 
organization open to all.[19] Where termination of dues checkoff is in retaliation for the exercise 
of speech and associational rights, however, it may violate the First Amendment, although the 
employer need not provide the checkoff in the first instance.
[20]
 With this background, the article 
will next look at the limitations enacted in 2011 and 2012. 
 
III. Dues Limitations of 2011 and 2012 
 
With the revolutionary changes in public sector bargaining laws in recent years came changes in 
dues laws as well.  Both Alabama and Arizona enacted limitations on dues deductions for 
political purposes.
[21]
 Wisconsin eliminated fair share and payroll deduction of dues for all 
except public safety employees.
[22]
 Michigan and North Carolina eliminated payroll deduction 
for education employees.
[23]
 Many other states proposed similar limitations.
[24]
 In addition, the 
enactment of right to work legislation will bar negotiation of fair share agreements in Indiana 
and Michigan.
[25]
 
 
The payroll deduction limitations in Alabama, Arizona, Michigan, North Carolina and Wisconsin 
were all enjoined on constitutional grounds.   One of the Wisconsin cases was recently reversed 
by the Seventh Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit just reversed the Michigan case.[26] These 
decisions and the specifics of the laws enjoined will be discussed below. 
 
1. Deductions for Political Purposes 
 
The Alabama law limits public employee payroll deductions for political activity or for 
membership dues for organizations that use such dues for political activity.[27] This prohibition 
appears narrower than a total ban, but in effect may discourage all dues deductions because of 
criminal sanctions imposed for violation of the law and the inability of individual employees to 
control the use of their dues. The Alabama law also requires the membership organizations to 
certify and prove each year that none of the membership dues were spent on political activity. 
Failure to do so or false submission would terminate the organization’s ability to obtain dues 
deduction. 
 
The Alabama law was enjoined based on a First Amendment challenge in Alabama Education 
Association v. Bentley,
[28]
 which found the statute overbroad and vague. The Eleventh Circuit 
narrowed the injunction, however, allowing the law to take effect so long as it applied only to 
dues deductions for electioneering activities, certifying to the Alabama Supreme Court questions 
about the scope of the statute.
[29]Subsequently, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ equal 
protection and viewpoint discrimination claims but declined to dismiss the claims of retaliation 
for constitutionally protected speech, which are currently in the discovery process.
[30]
 
The Arizona law requires organizations accepting dues through payroll deduction to certify that 
none of the dues are used for political purposes or to specify the percentage used for political 
purposes, with a substantial fine if the predicted percentage is exceeded.[31] It also requires a 
special written authorization from employees, renewed annually, to have deducted dues used for 
political purposes. The law exempts charitable organizations, employee benefits organizations, 
and organizations of public safety officers from its provisions.  The Arizona law was 
preliminarily, and then permanently, enjoined on First Amendment grounds because it was not 
uniformly applied to unions and other organizations that could use funds for political purposes 
and therefore, was not viewpoint neutral.
[32]
 
 
2. Deductions of Full Dues for Certain Unions 
 
Legislatures in Michigan, North Carolina and Wisconsin banned deduction of all dues for 
identified unions, with Wisconsin also eliminating fair share agreements.  In Michigan and North 
Carolina, the ban applied only to education unions, while in Wisconsin, it applied to general 
employee unions, but not public safety employee unions, which were defined in the 
statute.
[33]
 The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan enjoined the legislation from 
taking effect, concluding that the union plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of both 
their Equal Protection and First Amendment claims.[34]
 
The court found no rational basis for the 
legislation, suggesting that it appeared to be directed at limiting the power and speech of a 
politically unpopular group based on viewpoint.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the 
defendants’ motion for a stay of the district court’s injunction but subsequently reversed the 
district court’s decision, finding no viewpoint discrimination.[35] The North Carolina Superior 
Court issued a temporary restraining order, and later preliminary and permanent injunctions, 
preventing the legislation from taking effect on both procedural and substantive constitutional 
grounds, the latter retaliatory viewpoint discrimination.[36] 
 
The legal path of the Wisconsin statute is more complex.  Lawsuits were filed in both state and 
federal court.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected a procedural challenge to the statute based 
on the state constitution,
[37]
 while the federal district court and a state trial court both found the 
dues deduction provisions of the statute unconstitutional based on the unjustifiable distinction 
between general and public safety unions.
[38]
The federal district court upheld the limitation of 
fair share provisions to public safety employees while the state trial court found the entire law 
unconstitutional in one case. The decision of the federal district court was recently reversed by 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the statute in its entirety.
[39]
 
 
  
3. Legislative Patterns 
 
There is an unmistakable pattern in these legislative actions which led to initial court victories 
for unions challenging their constitutionality.  Most of the laws apply to some but not all unions, 
burdening the speech of the disfavored organizations.  Most of the laws were enacted using 
surreptitious and unusual, and sometimes improper, legislative tactics.  Additionally, most 
targeted particular unions that had recently engaged in political activities in opposition to 
proponents of the legislation. And finally, in most cases, leaders of the legislative body made 
public statements suggesting political reasons for the legislation. These common elements, which 
will be discussed in more detail below, supported the argument that the motivation for the dues 
deduction bans was either suppression of certain political views or retaliation for political 
activity or both. 
Except for the Alabama statute, the laws target some, but not all unions. The Arizona and 
Wisconsin bills except public safety unions from the ban, while Michigan and North Carolina 
barred deductions only for education unions.  In North Carolina, only the North Carolina 
Association of Educators was affected, because the authorizing legislation permitted deductions 
only for unions with a specified level of membership.  This distinction between unions alone led 
the Arizona court to enjoin enforcement of the statute.[40] 
 
A brief description of the enactment of the legislation in the other four states will demonstrate 
the remainder of the legislative pattern.  In Alabama, the court allowed the claim of retaliatory 
viewpoint discrimination to proceed, noting that the plaintiff, Alabama Education Association, 
had repeatedly clashed with the Governor on political issues and then subsequently supported an 
opponent to his chosen successor in the Republican primary.
[41]
 The Governor announced that 
the organization should stay out of the primary and two days later the state comptroller decided 
to stop the longstanding practice of making payroll deductions for political action committees, a 
decision for which the Governor took credit.  After the election, which resulted in a Republican 
sweep of the legislature and governorship, the legislation at issue, which codified the practice 
instituted by the comptroller, was enacted. 
 
In Michigan, the legislation had lain dormant for months.[42] It was resurrected and passed using 
a suspension of rules in both chambers within hours of the union’s announcement of a political 
campaign to obtain a constitutional amendment protecting collective bargaining.[43] According 
to the complaint, the decision to seek the constitutional amendment followed a series of 
legislative enactments curbing collective bargaining rights and reducing the benefits of school 
employees, which triggered a political response by the union, including a recall effort directed at 
the primary sponsor of the legislation.[44] The complaint also quotes the Speaker of the House 
stating that the union has “declared war” by promoting recalls and the Senate Majority Leader as 
saying “[t]he teachers union specifically the Michigan Education Association have lost their (sic) 
way and public school employees should no longer be forced to join them.”[45] 
 
The court enjoined the legislation, finding the action was likely to succeed on the merits because 
the legislation had no rational basis; instead it appeared to be motivated by a desire to limit the 
political power of an unpopular group by limiting their ability to speak. The court rejected the 
asserted cost rationale for the law, noting that the legislature had found the cost was 
negligible.
[46]
 In these days of computer payroll systems, the cost of adding deductions is far less 
than in earlier times and, as the Michigan court recognized, may no longer be sufficient to justify 
limitations.   The court of appeals reversed, over a strong dissent, finding no likelihood of 
success on the merits.  The court found no viewpoint discrimination since the legislation was 
directed at school employers not unions, and the deduction process was neither speech nor a 
nonpublic forum.[47] 
 
The North Carolina legislation followed a path similar to that of Michigan.  Despite numerous 
legislative sessions and a Senate override vote, the House of Representatives failed for months to 
consider overriding the Governor’s veto of the legislation, which was scheduled to take effect 
July 1, 2011.[48] Then in January 2012, after a late night veto session called for the sole purpose 
of considering another vetoed bill, the House adjourned and reconvened to override the 
Governor’s veto on the dues deduction bill at 12:45 a.m.[49] The Speaker of the House was 
quoted as stating that the legislation was prompted by the Association’s mailings targeting 
Democrats who had voted with Republicans on the state budget, and  he subsequently 
acknowledged that the organization’s politics were a factor in the legislation.[50] As in the case 
of Michigan, these statements reflect the strategic timing of the legislation, in direct response to 
political activity by the Association.  The permanent injunction was based on “retaliatory 
viewpoint discrimination.”[51] 
 
Finally, the highly publicized Wisconsin legislation reveals a similar pattern.  It was peculiarly 
structured using unprecedented classifications that targeted unions which did not support the 
governor’s election, while preserving dues deduction for unions that supported the 
Governor.[52]Statements by State Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald were even clearer 
than those in Michigan and North Carolina regarding the intent to suppress political views. 
Fitzgerald stated, 
 
If we win this battle [over the passage of the Act], and the money is not there under the 
auspices of the unions, certainly what you’re going to find is President Obama is going to 
have a . . . much more difficult time getting elected and winning the state of Wisconsin.[53] 
 
As in Michigan and North Carolina, quick votes and limited opportunities for public input at 
hearings characterized the legislative process. Initial efforts to pass the legislation surfaced 
quickly and surprised advocates, resulting in the escape of the Democratic legislators to Illinois 
to avoid passage.[54] The actual passage involved parliamentary maneuvers that were challenged 
as violative of the Open Meetings Law and state constitutional provisions requiring open 
hearings.
[55]
 
 
There were several legal challenges to the law. The federal district court, analyzing the equal 
protection claim, found that there was no rational basis for the differential treatment of general 
unions and public safety unions with respect to dues deduction, rejecting as unpersuasive the 
rationale of preventing strikes by public safety employees.[56] The court noted that the law 
allowed public safety unions to collect fair share fees from objecting employees, while barring 
general unions from using payroll deduction to collect fees from voluntary members, suggesting 
that this result seemed particularly unlikely to further the goal of deterring strikes among public 
safety employees.[57] Further, the court found that the only apparent rationale for the distinction 
among unions was to suppress the speech of the general unions; consequently, the law violated 
the First Amendment.[58] The court did not find that the limitations on collective bargaining, 
which included a bar to negotiating fair share agreements, violated the constitution.[59] The 
court found fear of public safety strikes a more persuasive justification for this part of the 
law.[60]By way of contrast, the Dane County Circuit Court found the entire statute 
unconstitutional on both First Amendment and Equal Protection grounds because the distinctions 
between unions burdened the speech and association rights of some employees, but not others, 
without adequate justification.[61] 
 
The Seventh Circuit panel rejected the analysis of the lower court on the dues issue, upholding 
the entire law.
[62]
 The majority opinion found that dues deduction is a subsidy of speech and, 
thus, differential treatment of speakers is permissible unless the classification on the basis of 
speaker identity is inherently based on viewpoint.[63] The court concluded there was no reason 
to assume that different unions have different viewpoints.[64] Neither the disproportionate 
impact on groups with a particular view (Governor Walker’s opponents), nor the expressed 
political purpose of one member of the legislature established a motive of viewpoint 
discrimination.   Having found no viewpoint discrimination, the court then applied a rational 
basis test to the entire statute and concluded that the interest in labor peace among essential 
employees was rational even if the classifications may have been imperfectly suited to that 
purpose.[65] It refused to probe the motivations of the legislature and, indeed, suggested that 
politically motivated legislation was a reality of the democratic system.[66] 
 
Judge Hamilton dissented as to the finding regarding the dues deduction, while agreeing that the 
“flimsy” rationale of the state was sufficient for the “deferential rational basis” review of the 
remainder of the statute.
[67]
 Judge Hamilton concluded that once the state offered dues deduction 
it was not just a subsidy of speech but, instead, the dues deduction system became a nonpublic 
forum, which had to be viewpoint neutral.[68]Judge Hamilton, like the district court but unlike 
the majority, was willing to look behind the facial viewpoint neutrality.[69] Three factors 
convinced Judge Hamilton that the law was not viewpoint neutral.   First, Judge Hamilton found 
a lack of fit between the purpose of labor peace and the classification, resulting in the protection 
of dues deduction for unions that endorsed Walker and denial to those that did not.[70] For 
example, corrections officers, Capitol Police and the University of Wisconsin Police, who have 
important public safety responsibilities, were considered general employees, while the Motor 
Vehicle Inspectors, whose association endorsed Governor Walker, were considered public safety 
employees whose strike would endanger the public.[71] Relatedly, and for the same reason, 
Judge Hamilton found the state’s justifications for the classification weak, since a strike by 
corrections officers would be far more damaging than a strike by Motor Vehicle 
Inspectors.[72] Finally, the Fitzgerald statement revealing a political purpose was the third factor 
that persuaded Judge Hamilton that the ostensible neutrality masked a motive of viewpoint 
suppression.[73] 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s disposition is not the final word on the Wisconsin legislation as litigation 
in the state courts[74] and before the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission is 
ongoing.  If the rationale of the panel majority is accepted in other jurisdictions, however, many, 
if not all, recent dues limitations could be upheld as constitutional.[75] Before turning to the 
future, however, a brief review of other legislation relating to dues is helpful. 
 
IV. Right to Work Laws 
 
Legislation regarding dues is not limited to bans or partial bans on dues deduction or elimination 
of fair share legislation.  Both Indiana and Michigan adopted right to work laws in the last year, 
which prohibit public and private employee unions from negotiating fair share or agency shop 
agreements.[76] Like the dues deduction and fair share legislation discussed above, these laws 
restrict the ability of unions to fund their activities because unions are still required by law to 
represent all employees in their bargaining units where collective bargaining legislation 
exists.  A constitutional challenge to the Indiana law was recently rejected,
[77]
 while a challenge 
to the Michigan law is pending.
[78]
 
 
V. State Actions Favoring Union Dues Collection 
 
Not all recent state actions regarding union dues have imposed restrictions on unions, 
however.  California voters rejected a 2012 ballot referendum to ban payroll deduction of 
political contributions.[79] While applying to both corporations and unions, it was widely agreed 
that unions would suffer far more if the referendum passed because they rely far more heavily on 
payroll deduction for political funding than businesses.[80] In 2011, Maryland state employees 
began paying fair share fees for the first time under a law enacted in 2009.
[81]
 New Hampshire 
has twice rejected proposals to enact a right to work law.
[82]
 In addition, other state legislatures 
have entertained proposals to require fair share or payroll deduction of dues.
[83]
 
This review of the recent legislation and the cases challenging these new laws provides clues as 
to the reasons for their passage. We turn to this in the next section. 
VI. Why Union Dues? 
 
One might ask why union dues have drawn such attention in recent years.  While critics have 
branded collection of union dues as a self-interested grab for power and money,[84] the simple 
truth is that unions, like any other organization, cannot accomplish their purpose without 
resources. The sophistication of employers, the complexity of benefit programs such as pension 
and health insurance plans, the size and intricacy of governmental budgets, and the powerful 
anti-tax and anti-government lobbies, among other things, require a sophisticated and powerful 
union to accomplish the goals and protect the interests of public employees.[85] Labor unions 
have limited ability to raise funds from sources other than their members, or where fair share 
applies, from all employees they represent.  Accordingly, dues are necessary to permit the 
organization to continue to operate. 
 
Payroll deduction is important because it provides an effective mechanism for dues collection 
that requires only a single authorization from the employee. Once an employee authorizes 
payroll deduction, an employer deducts dues each pay period and remits them to the union. In the 
absence of payroll deduction, unions must establish independent mechanisms for dues collection, 
and no other method is as effective as payroll deduction.  Data demonstrates that even where 
membership is already voluntary, elimination of payroll deduction can result in substantial losses 
in dues payment and membership.[86] The union must then expend resources on organization 
and dues collection that might otherwise be spent on activities that directly benefit the bargaining 
unit. 
 
Thus, union dues are important to fund both the union’s representational and political 
activities.  While opponents often object to the political activity of unions, in the public sector 
union political activity can directly impact the terms and conditions of employment of the 
employees the union represents.[87] For example, increased government funding makes more 
money available for government employees’ wages and benefits or additional staffing to reduce 
their workload.  Additionally, political action can directly impact the working conditions of 
employees.  Longer school days and larger classes affect teacher workloads, as does the number 
of police officers assigned to a shift or the number of firefighters to a truck.  Yet it is precisely 
the power to influence such decisions that leads to opposition to public sector unions. 
 
Opponents of unions in general and of public sector bargaining in particular see the funding 
limitations created by the economic crisis as an opportunity to limit the power of public sector 
unions. The Right to Work Committee and the National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation have long been active in this role in both the public and private sectors, but in recent 
years they have been joined by conservative groups arguing that the power of public sector 
unions is detrimental to the public interest. When the economic storm hit, devastating state and 
local government budgets, these conservative groups seized the opportunity to push for 
legislation limiting bargaining and dues collection. Model legislation developed by the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the policy papers and proposals of other conservative 
think tank organizations reveal the goal of the elimination of mandatory collective bargaining, 
fair share, and payroll deduction of union dues.[88]Additionally, political rhetoric and research 
from conservative organizations and politicians have focused heavily on teachers and their 
unions as impediments to education reform.[89] These conservative groups frequently cite the 
size, power, and political spending of the National Education Association, the largest union in 
the country,[90] as an obstacle to educational change.[91] Finally, there is the pure political 
reality that unions lean heavily Democratic and any impairment of their ability to collect funds 
benefits Republican and conservative causes.[92] Given these facts, along with Republican 
successes in state level elections in 2010, the emergence of strikingly similar legislative 
campaigns directed at union dues, particularly of the teachers’ unions, is not 
surprising.[93] Having reviewed the current status of the law, and the reasons for the importance 
of the issue to both unions and their opponents, we look next to what the future holds. 
 
  
VII. The Future 
 
The legal battles over existing legislation are likely to continue.  It seems unlikely, however, that 
the union plaintiffs will petition for U.S. Supreme Court review of any losing decision, although 
the defendants well might.  Unions have been largely unsuccessful in the Supreme Court in 
recent dues cases and the rhetoric from some justices suggests an inclination to restrict dues 
collection even further.[94] Last term, in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 
1000, the Court rejected the union’s argument that it did not need to send an additional notice to 
members regarding a mid-year special assessment, providing them the opportunity to object to 
any political spending included.
[95]
 The Court also reached out to decide an issue neither briefed 
nor argued by the parties.[96] The Court determined that the union could not charge objectors the 
percentage of the assessment that represented chargeable expenses from the previous year, even 
though this prevented the union from collecting the full cost of representation.
[97]
 Even more 
striking, the Court ruled that nonmembers could not be charged the assessment at all unless they 
opted in, instead of applying the opt out rule used in all prior cases.[98] This was a position that 
was not even advocated by the petitioners.
[99]
 The majority opinion extensively discussed and 
critiqued longstanding precedent, under which unions were allowed to charge nonmembers the 
cost of representation unless the employees opted out of the charges.[100]The Court did not 
overrule these decisions, however.
[101]
 While the Knox decision has been criticized as at odds 
with other First Amendment cases such as Citizens United,
[102]
 the Court’s disposition 
in Knox may foreshadow a future Court decision that limits the ability of a union to charge 
nonmembers the cost of representation absent the nonmember’s consent. 
 
Depending on the political winds, additional legislation may impair or assist unions in their 
ability to collect dues from their members and other employees that they represent.  Although the 
recent legislation discussed above may be vulnerable to legal attack because of the structure and 
circumstances surrounding passage, it is clear from earlier cases that bans on payroll deduction 
and fair share can be structured to meet constitutional requirements, particularly if legislators are 
willing to ban deductions for all unions.  Unions might be well-served to invest in alternative 
methods of dues collection such as automatic credit card charges or bank drafts, which are 
relatively efficient and require a reduced expenditure of union resources.  Employees can 
terminate these deductions more easily than employer-based deductions, however, requiring the 
union to engage in continual marketing to convince employees of the value of their union 
membership.  While this too requires investment of funds, such campaigning is essential to union 
survival and effective employee representation in the current political climate, where affluent 
union opponents spend massive sums of money to convince employees that unions are not acting 
in their best interests. 
The future of unions and collective bargaining is closely tied to the ability of unions to maintain 
their funding.  Collective bargaining has predominated historically in the United States as a 
vehicle for employee voice and as an instrument of limiting income inequality.
[103]
 In addition, in 
the public sector, union lobbying can persuade legislators to fund important government 
initiatives, such as those relating to education and law enforcement.  Collective bargaining also 
has a role to play in times of crisis and may lead to creative solutions to governmental 
challenges.  Without a reliable source of funding, the role of unions in collective bargaining and 
in the political process will be diminished.  Severe reductions in the ability of unions to facilitate 
employee participation in the workplace and the political process will bring about fundamental 
changes in the American democracy.  Given the power and resources of union opponents and the 
current slide in union membership, accelerated by state legislation, such change is not beyond the 
realm of possibility.  A robust debate about the role of unions in public employment is a worthy 
endeavor for there are strongly held conflicting views. However, without a viable labor 
movement such a debate will be both one-sided and meaningless. 
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I. IELRA Developments 
A. Bargaining Units 
 
In Danville Community Consolidated School District 118 and Danville Education Association, 
IEA-NEA, Case No. 2013-RS-0002-S (IELRB 2013), the IELRB certified the proposed merger 
of two bargaining units, one consisting of teachers and teacher aides and another consisting of 
secretarial and clerical employees even though it had previously determined that the teachers did 
not share a sufficient community of interest with the clerical employees to justify the inclusion of 
both groups in a single bargaining unit. 
 
In 1987, the Danville Education Association filed a petition with the IELRB seeking to add non-
unionized teacher aides and clerical employees to an existing bargaining unit of teachers. In its 
1989 Opinion and Order, the IELRB decided that such a bargaining unit would be inappropriate, 
finding that the teachers and clerical employees did not share a sufficient community of interest 
to justify including them in the same bargaining unit. The IELRB noted that the Association only 
sought to add a portion of the District’s unrepresented employees to the unit and suggested that if 
the Association had sought to create a “wall-to-wall” bargaining unit of all of the District’s 
unrepresented employees, such a bargaining unit might be appropriate because it would increase 
bargaining efficiency. 
Pursuant to its 1989 Opinion and Order, the IELRB certified the Association as the exclusive 
representative of two distinct bargaining units, one consisting of teachers and teacher aides and 
another of secretarial and clerical employees. In the interim, the remaining portions of the 
District’s workforce were organized. On August 1, 2012 the Association filed a new 
representation petition seeking to merge the teacher/teacher aide bargaining unit and the clerical 
bargaining unit into one. 
The IELRB framed the issue as “whether the situation has changed since our previous decision 
in 1989 so that the unit proposed in this case is now appropriate.” Both parties stipulated that the 
duties of the teachers, teacher aides, and clerical employees had not materially changed since the 
1989 decision. 
In determining that the merger was appropriate, the IELRB first discussed the fact that the 
District’s remaining employees were now unionized. In its 1989 decision, the IELRB declared 
that “[k]ey to our determination is the fact that the requested unit seeks some, but not all, of the 
District’s remaining employees.” In that case, the IELRB declared that in a “residual or wall-to-
wall unit” the preference for a community of interest within the bargaining unit can be 
overridden “in order to achieve efficiency and to ensure an opportunity for representation for 
everyone.” In this case, the IELRB held that the lack of a community of interest between the 
teachers and clerical staff was less dispositive now that the entirety of the District’s staff was 
unionized, stating, “The unit that is proposed in this case is similar to a residual unit in terms of 
efficiency in bargaining, because it reduces the number of units with which the District must 
bargain. Therefore, a lesser community of interest can be acceptable. “ 
The Board next analyzed the parties’ bargaining history, observing that a history of coordinated 
bargaining is a factor leaning in favor of merging two units. The record showed that since 1989, 
the Association and the District had negotiated successor collective bargaining agreements for 
the teacher/teacher aide bargaining unit and the clerical bargaining unit “on the same days and at 
the same time.” THE IELRB Found that there existed a history of coordinated bargaining. 
The IELRB relied on Black Hawk College Professional Technical Unit v. IELRB, where the 
Illinois Appellate Court held that when evaluating the proposed merger of two bargaining units, 
the Board is to focus on the similarities of the two units instead of the differences. 275 Ill.App.3d 
189, 655 N.E.2d 1054 (1st Dist. 1995). Further, the Board cited the Appellate Court for the 
proposition that that IELRA does not require that a bargaining unit be the most appropriate unit 
possible under the statute, but only “that the unit be appropriate.” See Sandburg Faculty Ass’n, 
IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 248 Ill.App.3d 1028, 1036, 618 N.E.2d 989, 995 (1993). 
Finally, the IELRB recognized that its decision finding the proposed unit appropriate did not end 
the matter. The Board stated that: “[w]hether the proposed bargaining unit is ultimately approved 
will depend on the desires of the employees, [who] [] will have the opportunity to express [their 
opinions] in the election to be conducted subsequently.”  The IELRB directed that a unit-
preference vote be conducted among the employees. 
B. Anti-Union Discrimination 
 
In Illinois Eastern Community Colleges Association v. Board of Trustees of Illinois Eastern 
Community Colleges, Case No. 2011-CA-0008-S (IELRB 2013), the IELRB affirmed the 
Recommended Decision of the ALJ that the complaint be dismissed because the Complainants 
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination to discourage union activity. 
The events giving rise to this complaint began in early 2010 when the Employer compiled a list 
of twenty-seven employees for a reduction-in-force (“RIF”). The list included five employees 
who Complainants alleged were targeted for their union activity. Prior to the final determination 
by the Employer one of the five employees resigned from employment. In March, the Employer 
determined it would be necessary to lay-off twenty-one employees. All four of the remaining 
employees who Complainant alleged were targeted for union activity, were laid off. When the 
Employer recalled ten employees, none of the four were recalled. 
The IELRB Board analyzed the three elements of a prima facie case of discrimination.  The first 
element, that the employees participated in activity protected by the Act, was satisfied, and the 
Employer did not contest that assertion.  The IELRB found that that the second element of the 
prima facie case, that the employer was aware of the protected activity, was also satisfied despite 
the Employer’s exception with respect to two of the employees. The Board found that both 
employees were heavily involved with noticeable union activities. One was a member of the 
union negotiating team, and the other one was a treasurer for the union. 
The Board found that the third element of the prima facie case, that the employer took action to 
encourage or discourage the protected activity, was not satisfied. There was adverse action taken 
against the Complainants when they were laid-off, but the IELRB stated that the Complainants 
must also show that the adverse action was taken because of protected activity. The 
Complainants pointed to many instances of what they perceived as disparate treatment against 
employees heavily involved in the union, such as: not allowing one employee to teach summer 
school, requesting the same employee not be a union negotiator, and forcing another employee to 
teach at multiple campuses rather than just one. The IELRB determined that all instances 
provided, other than one, were too remote in time to show anti-union animus. In addition, the 
Board found that there was little evidence to show that union supporters were singularly 
punished for actions tolerated with respect to other employees. The Complainants also pointed to 
a prior history of grievances as proof of anti-union animus, but the IELRB stated that a history of 
prior grievances or unfair labor practices is not enough on its own to show unlawful motive. The 
IELRB also rejected the Complainant’s contention that all four riffed union activists were not 
recalled as not establishing a prima facie case of discrimination because there was no showing of 
how active the others in the non-recalled group were or how active all the members of the union 
as a whole were when compared to the group the was not recalled. 
II. IPLRA Developments 
 
A. Duty to Bargain 
 
In Midlothian Professional Fire Fighters Association, Local 3148, International Association of 
Fire Fighters and Village of Midlothian, 29 PERI ¶ 125 (IL LRB-SP 2013) (Case No. S-CA-10-
287), the ILRB State Panel held that the Village of Midlothian (“Midlothian”) violated IPLRA 
Section 10(a)(4) and (1) by bargaining to impasse on its proposal that employee discipline or 
discharge not be subject to the parties’ grievance and arbitration procedures. 
The parties had a collective bargaining agreement that provided Midlothian with authority to 
discipline or suspend employees for just cause.  The agreement also recognized the statutory 
authority of Midlothian’s board of fire and police commissioners to discipline employees, and it 
indicated it did not intend to diminish the authority of that entity.  During negotiations for a 
successor agreement, the Union made a proposal that would allow it to grieve, to arbitration, 
terminations or suspensions exceeding five days.  Midlothian rejected the proposal and the 
successor agreement included a just cause provision.  Subsequently, Midlothian became a home 
rule municipality and, during additional negotiations, Midlothian argued to the point of impasse 
that neither employee discipline nor discharge should be subject to the grievance 
procedure.  Instead, Midlothian adopted an ordinance prohibiting the removal or discharge of 
employees except for cause.  The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge. 
The ILRB noted that the primary issue in the case was whether the proposal made by Midlothian, 
a home-rule municipality, to have discipline considered by its board of fire and police 
commissioners and not pursuant to the arbitration provisions of the parties’ collective bargaining 
agreement concerned a permissive subject of bargaining.  The State Panel applied its decision 
is Village of Wheeling, 17 PERI ¶ 2018 (ILRB-SP 2001).  The Board found that Village of 
Wheeling was sound and that subsequent legislative activity revealed an intent to broaden its 
applicability to include the instant matter. 
 The State Panel noted that the statutory amendment at issue in Village of Wheeling, Public Act 
91-650, was intended to “undo” an appellate court decision that held that a city is precluded from 
bargaining over matters that are covered by the Municipal Code.  The Board noted that itsVillage 
of Wheeling decision is based on the premise that any substantive term agreed to by the parties 
pursuant to their Section 7 bargaining obligation creates a statutory right to grievance arbitration 
pursuant to the contractual provision required by Section 8 in all circumstances, “unless [as 
Section 8 permits] mutually agreed otherwise.”  Thus, while the substantive matters affecting 
terms and conditions of employment bargained in Section 7 are mandatory, the Board in Village 
of Wheeling found that Section 8’s reference to the “mutual agree[ment]” to avoid arbitration on 
substantive matters was a permissive subject of bargaining. 
 
Moreover, the Board noted that the language in the Municipal Code relied on by the Village of 
Wheeling was amended in 2007 to the following (strike-outs show language stricken by the 2007 
amendment and the italicized portion shows language newly added in 2007): 
 
§10-2.1-17. Removal or discharge; investigation of charges; retirement. Except as 
hereinafter provided in this Section, no officer or member of the fire or police 
department of any municipality subject to this Division 2.1 shall be removed or 
discharged except for cause, upon written charges, and after an opportunity to be 
heard in his own defense. The hearing shall be as hereinafter provided, unless the 
employer and the labor organization representing the person have negotiated an 
alternative or supplemental form of due process based upon impartial arbitration 
as a term of a collective bargaining agreement. Such In non-home rule units of 
government, such bargaining shall be permissive rather than mandatory unless the parties 
mutually agree otherwise. Any such alternative agreement shall be permissive. such 
contract term was negotiated by the employer and the labor organization prior to or at the 
time of the effective date of this amendatory Act, in which case such bargaining shall be 
considered mandatory. 
Further, the State Panel noted that the legislative history confirmed that the General Assembly 
intended to make the holding of Village of Wheeling universally applicable.  Specifically, the 
Board relied on a comment by Illinois Representative Dugan that stated that the 2007 amended 
Code provision was intended to create equal bargaining rights for all professional firefighters, 
regardless of whether their employer was a home rule municipality, a non-home rule 
municipality, or a fire protection district. 
  
B. Supervisors 
 
On April 5, 2013, Governor Pat Quinn signed SB 1556 into law (Public Act 097-1172), available 
at, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=097-1172, which makes several 
changes to the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA). The bill was passed in the Senate on 
January 8, 2013, after passing the House back in May 2011, but the bill remained on the 
Governor’s desk for several months before he signed it in early April. The amendments to the 
IPLRA contained in the bill went into effect immediately. 
 
SB 1556 makes several changes to the IPLRA, each of which make it easier to exclude managers 
and supervisors from coverage under the Act and some provisions that give the Governor power 
to remove individuals from bargaining units. Under the IPLRA as now amended, state 
employees working under the Attorney General, the Comptroller, the Secretary of State and the 
Treasurer, that were certified in a bargaining unit on or after December 2, 2008, which a petition 
was filed with the ILRB on or after the effective date of SB 1556, or for which a petition is 
pending before the ILRB, now are covered by a much more narrow definition of “managerial 
employee.” The new definition no longer requires that an individual be “predominantly” engaged 
in managerial and executive functions to qualify as a managerial employee. Further, the 
definition was also expanded by adding language to exclude workers “who [represent] 
management interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control 
or implement policy.” 
The bill also makes substantive changes to the supervisory exclusion for the same class of 
workers covered by the definitional change for managerial employees. These workers are now 
subject to the same standards used under the National Labor Relations Act, as the changes to the 
IPLRA explicitly reference the NLRA and relevant NLRB precedent. The changed language 
states that these employees will qualify as a supervisor based on “(A) Section 152 of the National 
Labor Relations Act and (B) orders of the National Labor Relations Board interpreting that 
provision or decisions of courts reviewing decisions of the National Labor Relations Board.” 
The amendments also limit which workers can be included in bargaining units by amending the 
definition of “public employer” to exclude the Office of the Governor, the Governor’s Office of 
Management and Budget, the Illinois Finance Authority, the Office of the Lt. Governor, and the 
State Board of Elections. 
Another important change made by SB 1556 was defining a new class of employees labeled 
“legislative liaisons,” which are also excluded from the IPLRA’s coverage. The Act defines 
legislative liaisons as “a person who is an employee of a State agency, the Attorney General, the 
Secretary of State, the Comptroller, or the Treasurer, as the case may be, and whose job duties 
require the person to regularly communicate in the course of his or her employment with any 
official or staff of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois for the purpose of influencing 
any legislative action.” 
Finally, one of the most significant changes contained in SB 1556 is the addition of Section 6.1 
to the IPLRA, which gives the Governor the power to exempt up to 3,580 positions in agencies 
directly responsible to him from the Act’s coverage. Out of this total number of positions that 
can be exempted, the Governor is able to exempt up to 1,900 that are already included in a 
bargaining unit; effectively giving the Governor power to remove employees added to bargaining 
units over the last several years. However, this provision of the Bill does include some 
limitations on the types of positions that may be exempted. The Governor has one year from the 
effective date of the amendatory Act to exercise the powers added by Section 6.1. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
